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I. Introduction
In May 1993, Norway announced that it intended to resume limited,
controlled commercial whaling.' Although the International Whaling
Commission2 (of which Norway is a founding member) voted by an
eighteen to six margin to uphold the moratorium on commercial whaling
* B.A. (Toronto), LL.B. (University of Victoria, Canada). The author is currently working as
an international lawyer in Oslo, Norway. The author would like to sincerely thank Professor
Ted McDorman for his assistance in the preparation of this paper.
1. For the 1993-94 season, Norway announced that it would allow its whalers to catch 296
minke whales in the northeast Atlantic out of a total estimated minke stock of 86,700. 160 of
these whales will be taken for commercial use and 136 for scientific research purposes. See
"Retention of Commercial Whaling Ban" (1993) 39:4 Keesing's Record of World Events 91;
N. Schoon, "Head of Whaling Body Quits over 'Political Move' The [London] Independent
(11 June 1993). For the 1993-94 season, there will be inspectors on board every Norwegian
whaling vessel to ensure compliance with these strict quotas. See Royal Norwegian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Information Release UDA249ENG, "Norwegian Policy on the Exploita-
tion of Living Marine Resources" (Oslo: NORINFORM, June 1990).
2. The International Whaling Commission [hereinafter IWC] is the international body having
jurisdiction to manage whales under the International Whaling Convention. See International
Conventionfor the Regulation of Whaling, 2 December 1946, 61 Stat. (2) 1716, T.I.A.S. No.
1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72, art ]1I(1) [hereinafter International Whaling Convention].
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originally established in 1985-86,1 Norway's decision to resume limited
commercial whaling was not illegal. Norway had legally "opted out" of
the moratorium by way of the Objections Procedure contained in the
International Whaling Convention.4 Beyond being legal, Norway's deci-
sion to resume small-scale harvesting of minke whale stocks was in
accordance with the findings of the Scientific Committee of the IWC,
which had concluded that North Atlantic minke whale stocks were not in
immediate danger and could be safely harvested on a sustainable basis.'
Nonetheless, Norway's move was greeted with scorn and outrage by
many countries. Fifteen nations signed a resolution "expressing dismay
at Norway's actions."' 6 Several IWC member countries appear committed
to the complete abolition of the whale hunt without consideration of
scientific and economic justifications that support sustained whaling on
a controlled basis.7 The United States has threatened to impose trade
sanctions against Norway over the latter's decision, despite the fact that
Norway has not violated any international legal or treaty obligations.3
3. See "Commerce Notifies President that Norway's Resumption of Whaling is Basis for
Embargo" Int'l Trade Reporter (BNA) (18 August 1993) 1358.
4. See International Whaling Convention, supra note 2, art. V(3). Contracting governments
which formally register an objection to amendments passed pursuant to the International
Whaling Convention, within 90 days of being notified of the amendments by the IWC, are not
legally bound by the amendments. See P. Bimie, "International Legal Issues in the Manage-
ment and Protection of the Whale: A Review of FourDecades of Experience" (1989) 29 Nat.
Resources J. 903 at 912 [hereinafter "International Legal Issues in the Management and
Protection of the Whale"].
5. The Scientific Committee of the IWC had determined that northeast Atlantic minke whale
stocks had recovered to a level of 86,700 animals. This is widely considered to represent more
than 54 percent of theirpre-exploitation level, the yardstick used by the IWC tojudge the health
of a particular whale species. See "Head of Whaling Body Quits over 'Political Move'," supra
note 1; G. Neale, "Greens Prepare to Raise a Storm against Hunters" Sunday [London]
Telegraph (25 April 1993); Editorial, "A Misguided Policy on Whaling" Chicago Tribune (25
May 1993). See also "General Developments" Int'l Trade Reporter (BNA) (10 November
1993) 1912; Country Report (Norway), "ThePolitical Scene: Whaling Issue Returns" Business
International (5 July 1993) [hereinafter "Whaling Issue Returns"].
6. See "President Clinton Delays Whaling Sanctions on Norway" Int'l Trade Reporter (BNA)
(6 October 1993) 1678.
7. See infra note 41. One commentator has written that from "the early seventies onwards
more than twenty nations having no tangible whaling interests have entered the (IWC),
bringing with them a range of concerns of an ecological, economic and political-legal nature,
pushing the membership profile in a conservationist direction." See A.H. Hoel, The Interna-
tional Whaling Commission 1972-1984: New Members, New Concerns (Oslo: Fridtjof
Nansens Institute, 1985) at 8.
8. Ibid. Norway was certified by the United States Department of Commerce under the Pelly
Amendment, an amendment to the 1967 Fishermen's Protective Act, which gives the President
authority to ban imports from a country within 60 days of the certification. See Pelly
Amendment, Pub. L. No. 92-219,85 Stat. 786 (1954) (codified as amended at22 U.S.C. s. 1978
(1988)); Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967,22 U.S.C. ss. 1971-89 (1988); and text accom-
panying notes 52-113. See also "General Developments," supra note 5.
The Resumption of Limited Commercial Whaling
Norway is justifiably angered by the international response to its
decision.9 Throughout history, whaling has been essential to Norway's
coastal population. 10 Minke whale meat is an important part of the
Norwegian diet, particularly in northern and coastal areas." Norway was
a founding member of the IWC and has spearheaded whale conservation
efforts throughout much of the organization's forty-seven year history.12
Norway was "in the vanguard of states seeking the initial moratorium on
whaling in order to conserve stocks for future cultivation" in 1985.13
Further, Norway has demonstrated a very strong commitment to environ-
mental issues in general.' 4 This paper will briefly canvass recent whaling
controversies and the role of the International Whaling Commission
9. See, for example, J.J. Hoist, "Norway's Position on the Whaling Issue" (1993) 13:2 Int'l
Challenges (Oslo: Fridtjof Nansens Institute) 1. See also "Greens Prepare to Raise a Storm
against Hunters," supra note 5 (in which Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland
stated, "I cannot think of another case where many countries have chosen to ignore science and
tried to prevent another state from using a resource which is abundant").
10. See Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Release UDA246ENG,
"Norwegian Minke Whaling" (Oslo: NORINFORM, March 1993).
11. Ibid.
12. The original signatories to the IWC were Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Denmark, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, South Africa, the U.K., the
United States, and the U.S.S.R.
Among other initiatives, Norway proposed and implemented the first observer scheme
underthe IWC in the 1950's. See"International Legal Issues in the Management and Protection
of the Whale," supra note 4 at 908-15. More recently, Norway has led efforts to develop more
humane killing methods, particularly shorter times-to-death for whales and improved harpoon
accuracy. Norway has also introduced a draft proposal calling for an international observer on
every whaling vessel, rather than on only selected vessels. Further, at its most recent meeting,
the IWC noted "the past efforts by Norway in research on whales and investigation of their
habitat." See International Whaling Commission, Chairman's Report Of The 45th Annual
Meeting (November 1993) at 2-3,7, Appendix 8 [hereinafter Chairman's Report]. Prior to the
formation of the IWC, Norway pioneered one of the first attempts at conserving whale stocks,
by way of the 1929 Norvegian Whaling Act, which established the International Bureau of
Whaling Statistics. See Hoel, supra note 7 at 48.
13. See "Whaling Issue Returns," supra note 5.
14. Since the early 1970's, Norway has been at the forefront of efforts to develop international
cooperation to control pollution from industry and shipping, sewage discharges and dumping
of radioactive and otherwaste. Several international agreements on the protection of the marine
environment have been concluded at Norway's initiative, including the Oslo Convention for
the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, 15 February 1972,
U.K.T.S. 1975 No. 119, 11 I.L.M. 262; the London Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and otherMatter, 29 December 1972, U.K.T.S. 1976 No. 43,
11 I.L.M. 1294; and the BonnAgreement Concerning Pollution of the North Sea by Oil, 9 June
1969, 704 U.N.T.S. 3, 9 I.L.M. 359. See Norwegian Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Information Release UDA245ENG, "Environmental Protection and Management of Natural
Resources" (Oslo: NORINFORM, March 1993). See President's Message to the Congress on
Whaling Activities of Norway, 29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2000 (Oct. 4, 1993) [hereinafter
President's Message on Whaling Activities] (in which President Clinton characterizes Norway
as "an ally on numerous other environmental issues").
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therein, and will canvass the potential ramifications for Norway of its
decision to allow restricted whaling on a limited basis.
II. Background on the International Whaling Commission,
the International Whaling Convention and Recent
Whaling Controversies
The International Whaling Convention, signed in 1946, had as a principal
objective the "preservation and expansion of the whaling industry by
means of conserving stocks by regulating catching."15 The original
signatories intended "to establish a system of international regulation for
the whale fisheries to ensure the proper and effective conservation and
development of whale stocks ... and thus make possible the orderly
development of the whaling industry." 16 As one author put it, "[t]he major
whaling nations which originally formed the [IWC] were concerned with
the effect declining whale stocks would have on the economic viability
of the whaling industry." 17
Several provisions of the International Whaling Convention have
proven contentious over the Convention's forty-seven year history.
Article V(3), the Objections Procedure, 8 has been perhaps the most
contentious of all.' 9 Simply put, the Objections Procedure permits any
contracting government to avoid the force of an International Whaling
Convention amendment if it lodges an objection within 90 days of the
IWC notifying contracting governments of amendments to the Interna-
tional Whaling Convention or the Schedule thereto.20 Contracting gov-
ernments that have objected in accordance with this procedure are thus
not bound by the International Whaling Convention amendment in
question unless and until they withdraw their objections.21
15. See "International Legal Issues in the Management and Protection of the Whale," supra
note 4 at 909.
16. Ibid. See also International Whaling Convention, supra note 2, Preamble.
17. See E.A. Wehrmeister, "Giving the Cat Claws: Proposed Amendments to the Interna-
tional Whaling Convention" (1989) 11 Loy L.A. Int'l & Comp L.J. 417 at 418 [hereinafter
"Giving the Cat Claws"].
18. See International Whaling Convention, supra note 2, art. V(3).
19. See "International Legal Issues in the Management and Protection of the Whale," supra
note 4.
20. Only the Convention and amended Schedule are binding. See International Whaling
Convention, supra note 2, art. I. See also P. Bimie, ed., International Regulation of Whaling,
vol. 1 (New York: Oceana Publications, 1985) at 194.
21. Ibid.
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Aboriginal whaling, and its precise meaning, has also become a
controversial issue for the IWC.2z Although for many years the Schedule
to the International Whaling Convention has allowed catch limits to be
set for "aboriginal subsistence whaling to satisfy aboriginal subsistence
need," 23 some states have begun to seek a re-working of the Aboriginal
Whaling exception so that it would include "traditional" whaling by small
and remote coastal communities.24 The International Whaling Conven-
tion does not explicitly define "aboriginal" or "subsistence."'
Another contentious issue for the IWC has been the taking of whales
under the Scientific Permits exception to the International Whaling
Convention. Article VIII allows contracting governments to issue whal-
ing permits for the purposes of scientific research, notwithstanding stock
status and any commercial quotas which may be in place.26 Following the
imposition of the moratorium in 1985-86, a number of contracting states
were accused of using the Scientific Permits exemption as a means of
getting around the ban on commercial whaling.27 While amendments
have been made to give the Scientific Committee of the IWC greater
influence (though not control) over the issue of scientific permits 2 8 the
matter remains a divisive issue among IWC members.
Enforcement has similarly proved to be a controversial issue among
IWC members. The IWC has never had the institutional authority to
enforce its provisions. Since its inception, the International Whaling
Convention has been enforced nationally by its member states. Wide-
spread suspicion of poor national enforcement of catch quotas and other
IWC programs has plagued the IWC for years. It took eighteen years to
establish an International Observer Scheme, from 1955, when Norway
first proposed such a program, to 1972, when an ad hoc scheme was
22. See "International Legal Issues in the Management and Protection of the Whale," supra
note 4 at 929-30.
23. See Schedule to the International Whaling Convention, supra note 2.
24. See "International Legal Issues in the Management and Protection of the Whale," supra
note 4 at 930. For example, there are strong arguments for characterizing whaling by Icelanders
and Faroe Islanders as "aboriginal whaling."
25. Ibid. at 929.
26. International Whaling Convention, supra note 2. See "International Legal Issues in the
Management and Protection of the Whale," supra note 4 at 930.
27. Ibid. In particular, Japan and the Soviet Union were accused of substantially increasing
the number of permits given to nationals of their respective countries. Interestingly, the United
States, now one of the most vociferous opponents of whaling, set the precedent for redefining
commercial whaling as "whaling under Scientific Permits" when in the 1960s its shore-based
whaling industry was kept alive by issuing Scientific Permits. See Hoel, supra note 7 at 82;
S. Holt, "Whale Mining, Whale Saving" (1985) 9 Marine Pol'y 192.
28. Ibid. at 932.
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finally put in place.29 Even with the inauguration of the current observer
scheme, under which each contracting state is responsible for monitoring
its own nationals, difficulties have arisen when IWC member states have
postponed implementation of their part of the scheme for long periods of
time20
The United States plays a unique role in enforcing IWC quotas and
regulations. Although initially opposed to giving the IWC its own
enforcement powers, the United States has effectively become the
"policeman" of the IWC.31 The United States has enacted a number of
statutes which it can use to encourage countries to comply with IWC
quotas and regulations. These statutes are the Pelly Amendment, 2 the
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment,33 and the 1972 Marine Mammal
Protection Act.34 The bargaining leverage provided by these statutes has
been credited with persuading a number of countries to comply with, or
at least move towards compliance with, IWC quotas and programs.35 The
role of U.S. legislation in the enforcement of IWC programs will be more
thoroughly covered later in this paper.
Clearly, the IWC has reached a critical stage in its history. Iceland, a
traditional whaling nation, formally withdrew from the organization on
the eve of the 1992 annual meeting over the commercial moratorium.3 6
Norway has legally objected to the moratorium and has announced the
resumption of limited whaling.37 While Norway has chosen to remain a
29. Ibid. at 927.
30. For a short discussion of current rWC observer practices, see (1993) 43 Rep. Int'l Whal.
Commn. at 18.
31. See D.M. Wilkinson, "The Use of Domestic Measures to Enforce International Whaling
Agreements: A Critical Perspective" (1989) 17 Den. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 271 at 276. Wilkinson
quotes one commentator who stated that "the only effective sanctions to implement decisions
of the IWC are provided by the U.S. America pulled the IWC's teeth in the first place, and
America now provides the IWC's dentition."
32. Pelly Amendment, supra note 8. See text accompanying notes 57-86.
33. Packlwood-Magnuson Amendment of 1979, 16 U.S.C. s. 1821(e)(2) (1988). See text
accompanying notes 87-107.
34. MarineMammalProtectionActs. 101(a)(2), 16U.S.C.s. 1371(a)(2) (1988) [hereinafter
MMPA]. See text accompanying notes 108-113.
35. See T.L. McDorman, "The GATT Consistency of U.S. Fish Import Embargoes to Stop
Driftnet Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins and Turtles" (1991) 24 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. &
Econ. 477. See also Wilkinson, supra note31. Norway, Japan, the former Soviet Union, Chile,
Peru and Korea have all been threatened with U.S. trade sanctions over their whaling activities
at some point in the last twenty years.
36. See"Upholding of Whaling Ban for One Year" (1992) 38:7 Keesing's Record of World
Events 39032.
37. The Norwegian Government announced its decision on June 29, 1992. See Royal
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Release UDA250ENG, "Minke Whaling
in Norway" (Oslo: NORINFORM, April 1993) at 7.
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member of the IWC, it has also joined Iceland, the Faroes and Greenland
in establishing the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission
(NAMMC), a breakaway whaling body founded in 1992.38 These tradi-
tional whaling nations, committed to the objectives of the International
Whaling Convention including the long-term sustenance of whale stocks,
have found that many IWC member countries are unwilling to consider
the resumption of whaling of any scale even where stocks are scientifi-
cally proven to be neither threatened nor endangered. 39
The IWC faces a conflict of values amongst its members. The tradi-
tional whaling countries are largely of the view that whale stocks which
are neither endangered nor threatened (such as the northeast Atlantic
minke whale) can be safely harvested on a limited basis without adversely
affecting the future viability of those stocks.40 Countries with a domestic
whaling industry obviously have a substantial long-term economic
interest in maintaining and increasing whale stocks.
Yet traditional whaling states today face an increasingly intolerant
environmental movement that is unwilling to consider the commercial
harvest of any number of whales, regardless of the strength of any
particular whale stock.4' Several IWC members, many of whom have
never had a domestic whaling industry, are opposed to whaling of any
38. See S. Wheatley, "The Legal Protection of Whales-Time for a Re-think?" (1992) 143
New L.J. 855 at 856. See also supra note 36.
39. See infra note 41.
40. The Scientific Committee of the IWC has reached similar conclusions. As regards
northeast Atlantic minke whale stocks, international observers have agreed on a best-estimate
of 86,700 animals, which would sustain an annual catch of between 300 and 775 whales. See
"Greens Prepare to Raise a Storm against Hunters," supra note 5; Editorial, "The Difference
with Whales" Sydney Morning Herald (14 May 1993).
41. One source has reported that the IWC is dominated by an anti-whaling majority, led by
the United States, Britain and Australia, whose aim (heavily influenced by environmental
bodies such as Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Federation) is "to stretch out the IWC's
1986 moratorium on commercial whaling indefinitely, however healthy the level of whale
stocks." See "Head of Whaling Body Quits over 'Political Move'," supra note 1. Particularly
in the United States, environmental organizations play a significant role in the formation of
whaling policy. Greenpeace, Project Jonah and Friends of the Earth have been the most visible
of these, while the Monitor Consortium (a Washington-based umbrella organization to more
than fifty environmental organizations concerned with whales and whaling) has arguably had
the greatest political influence. See J.E. Scarff, "The International Management of Whales,
Dolphins and Porpoises: An Interdisciplinary Assessment" (1977) 6 Ecology L.Q. 326 at 385.
See also Hoel, supra note 7 at 99.
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kind.42 Now that northeast Atlantic minke whale stocks are widely
acknowledged to have recovered to a level that allows for controlled
hunting,43 these nations have moved from focusing on the need to save an
endangered species to emphasizing the intelligence and majesty of
whales and arguing that whale meat is a delicacy, not a necessity.44 The
efforts of these non-whaling IWC members are inconsistent with the IWC
Charter and the IWC's original objectives. When these countries
constitute a majority of IWC members, as they do today,46 it is under-
standable why several of the founding members of the IWC believe that
42. The United States, for example, has indicated that it will not endorse the resumption of
whaling on any scale, regardless of the abundance of particular stocks. See 'The Difference
with Whales," supra note 40. As one commentator has stated, "this is an easy position worth
easy environmental points for countries like the United States, where whaling has become an
anachronism. But for countries whose cultures are intertwined with whaling, and the eating of
whale meat, it is another matter." See "A Misguided Policy on Whaling," supra note 5. Some
Caribbean nations which joined the IWC in the early 1980's have acknowledged that they were
brought into the commission by environmental groups, and that they were even represented at
the commission by members of these groups. See A. Pollack, "Commission to Save Whales
Endangered, Too" The New York Times (18 May 1993) C4. Current "curious" members of the
IWC include Switzerland, Egypt and Monaco. See (1987) 37 Rep. Int'l Whal. Commn. at 6-7.
43. See supra note 40.
44. See supra note 41. As another source has stated, "what should have remained a scientific
issue has become a moral and political one, and the rallying cry of 'save the whales' has been
transmuted into 'save all the whales in all theirnumbers forall time'." See "A Misguided Policy
on Whaling," supra note 5.
Some of the arguments advanced by environmentalists against whaling are that the killing
of whales is inhumane, that it is unethical to kill cetaceans at all because of their status as a
highly intelligent life form, and that a small number of countries should not be able to exploit
what is a 'res omnium' which any country has a right to participate in the development of. One
observer has added: "the image of the endangered whale has remained a symbol for
organizations concerned with environmental protection.., saving whales is for millions of
people acrucial test oftheir political ability to halt environmental destruction." See Hoel, supra
note 7 at 78-79.
45. As previously mentioned, the original principal objective of the IWC was "the preserva-
tion and expansion of the whaling industry by means of conserving stocks by regulating
catching." A major goal of the original signatories was "to establish a system of international
regulation for the whale fisheries to ensure the proper and effective conservation and
development of whale stocks ... and thus make possible the orderly development of the
whaling industry." See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
46. Currently, non-whaling members outnumber traditional whaling states by more than a
two-to-one margin in the IWC.
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the International Whaling Convention "no longer fulfils its stated objec-
tives nor does it adequately represent their interests."'47
1I. Ramifications for Norway of its Decision to Allow the Resumption
of Limited Commercial Whaling
While the above developments obviously have important ramifications
for the IWC, Norway itself faces significant consequences from its
decision to resume small-scale whaling. One of these is the possibility of
U.S. trade sanctions, despite the fact that Norway has not breached an
international treaty, international law or international obligation.5
Norway's decision may also bring economic and political consequences
from the European Union and its member countries. 49 An action could be
brought against Norway in the International Court of Justice.50 Lastly,
extralegal activities by environmental groups are a distinct possibility,
particularly following remarks by Sea Shepherd's Paul Watson after
Norway announced it intended to resume limited whaling.
1. Potential U.S. Trade Sanctions
Over the last twenty-five years, U.S. lawmakers have enacted several
statutes designed to persuade other countries to follow U.S. practices in
the conservation and managementof whales, tuna, salmon, sea turtles and
dolphins.12 The aim of these laws is to induce foreign states to enter or
47. See Wheatley, supra note 38 at 856. See also Norwegian Royal Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, supra note 10 at 4 (in which Norwegian representatives express the view that the
"position of member countries of the IWC which oppose whaling on principle is in fact in
conflict with the Commission's own objectives"). One commentator has remarked that "the
entry of about 25 non-whaling nations has fundamentally changed the nature of the IWC. From
being a 'whaler's club' where the basic problem was the distribution of a total quota among
members with similar concerns, the IWC has been turned into an arena where antagonistic
interests meet: whalers vs. non-whalers." See Hoel, supra note 7 at 67.
48. See notes 52-113 and accompanying text.
49. European Union regulations prohibit the export of whale meat or its sale within the Union.
The European Union's stated intention to become a signatory to the International Whaling
Convention could generate additional international pressure on Norway to halt commercial
whaling. See "General Developments" Int'l Trade Reporter (Dec. 2,1992) 2068. In the private
sector, European seafood processors and distributors have expressed their dissatisfaction with
Norwegian whaling practices through boycotts of Norwegian seafood products. See "Norway
Out at Iceland" The Grocer (19 June 1993) 6. See also "Whales or Sales" Business Europe (7
June 1993) 4.
50. See notes 114-134 and accompanying text.
51. See G. Barrett, "Norway: Whalers Fight to Preserve aWay of Life" The [Melbourne]Age
(25 May 1993) and text accompanying notes 135-39.
52. See McDorman, supra note 35 at 478.
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comply with bilateral or multilateral agreements for the conservation and
management of particular ocean species, through the threat of unilateral
import trade sanctions against the offending state. 3 The U.S. laws which
have an impact on whaling practices are the Pelly Amendment,54 the
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment,5 and the 1972 MMPA.5 6 The opera-
tion of these laws is outlined below.
a) The Pelly Amendment
The Pelly Amendment was originally enacted in response to concerns
over conservation of the Atlantic salmon.57 However, the legislation now
aims to protect all species of fish,58 as well as endangered or threatened
species, provided that an international conservation program concerning
such species exists.59 As one commentator has noted: "[i]ronically,
neither the statutory language or [sic] House and Senate Committee
reports mentions whaling or the [International Whaling Convention]."6
Nonetheless, whaling and compliance with the International Whaling
Convention have become the central focus of the Pelly Amendment.6"
Under the Pelly Amendment, if the U.S. Secretary of Commerce
determines that nationals of a foreign country are conducting fish
operations in a manner or under circumstances which "diminish the
effectiveness" of an international fishery conservation program, then the
Secretary shall certify such determination to the President.62 Upon receipt
of such certification, the President may direct the Secretary of the
Treasury to prohibit the importation into the United States of "fish
53. Ibid.
54. See supra note 8.
55. See supra note 33.
56. See supra note 34.
57. See McDorman, supra note 35 at 482. See also G.S. Martin & J.S. Brennan, "Enforcing
the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling: The Pelly and Packwood-
Magnuson Amendments" (1989) 17 Den. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 293 at 294-95. See also American
Cetacean Society v. Baldridge, 604 F. Supp. 1398 at 1405-06 (D.D.C. 1985).
58. Supra note 8, s. 1978 (a) (1988). See McDorman, supra note 35 at 483.
59. Ibid.
60. See Martin & Brennan, supra note 57 at 295.
61. Ibid.
62. Supra note 8, s. 1978(a)(1)-(2). See McDorman, supra note 35 at 483, and Martin &
Brennan, supra note 57 at 295. On the meaning of "diminish the effectiveness," see L.F.
Morley, Jr., Case Comment (1987) 11 Suffolk Transnat'l L.J. 287 at 292 (noting that several
U.S. laws employ the "diminish the effectiveness" standard). To "certify" denotes the formal
sending of a letter to the President.
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products" 63 or wildlife products of the offending country for such dura-
tion as he determines appropriate and to the extent that such prohibition
is sanctioned by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.6' The
Secretary of Commerce must periodically review the situation and, if the
reasons for the certification no longer exist, the United States must
withdraw its certification and sanctions.65
The first certification under the Pelly Amendment came in 1974,
regarding the whale harvesting activities of Japan and the Soviet Union.66
At issue was a 1973 IWC quota on the harvest of minke whales.67 Both
countries had followed the Objections Procedure laid out in the Interna-
tional Whaling Convention, and thus were not bound by the quota.61 The
two countries allegedly harvested more minke whales than the total
international quota set by the IWC for 1973.69 Despite the technical
legality of the objections filed by Japan and the Soviet Union, the United
States Secretary of Commerce certified both countries under the Pelly
Amendment.70 However, President Ford opted not to impose trade sanc-
tions, on the ground that Japan and the Soviet Union had moved towards
strengthening their respective whale conservation schemes and comply-
ing with the IWC quota.7'
63. See Martin & Brennan, supra note 57 at 295. "Fish products" now includes "any aquatic
species (including marine mammals and plants) and all products thereof exported from an
offending country... or packed, processed, or otherwise prepared for export in such country
or within the jurisdiction thereof" (supra note 8, s. 1978(h)(4) (1988)).
64. Supra note 8, s. 1978(a)(4). See also Martin & Brennan, supra note 57 at 295. See
McDorman, supra note 35, for an in-depth analysis of the GATT consistency of U.S. fish
import embargoes to stop driftnet fishing and save whales, dolphins and turtles. General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, Can. T.S. 1947 No. 27, 61 Stat. A3, 55
U.N.T.S. 194, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 [hereinafter GAT1. For a discussion of proposed amend-
ments to the scope of the Pelly Amendment, see "Proposal to Modify the Pelly Amendments"
Oceans Policy News (November 1989) 4, and "Trade Restrictions Under the Pelly Amend-
ment" Oceans Policy News (June 1990) 7.
65. Ibid., s. 1978(d).
66. See McDorman, supra note 35 at 484.
67. Ibid. See also Martin & Brennan, supra note 57 at 298, and (1974) 25 Rep. Int'l Whal.
Commn. at 7.
68. See supra note 4. See also McDorman, supra note 35 at 484, and Birnie, supra note 20.
69. See McDorman, supra note 35 at 484, and Martin & Brennan, supra note 57 at 298.
70. Ibid. See also American Cetacean Society v. Baldridge, supra note 57 at 1402.
71. See President's Message to Congress Reporting on International Whaling Operations and
Conservation Programs, (1975) 1 Pub. Papers 47 at 47-48 (Jan. 16, 1975).
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Chile, Peru, South Korea and Norway have also been certified under
the Pelly Amendment for their whaling practices. 72 Although the United
States threatened trade sanctions pursuant to the Pelly Amendment
following each certification, to date no actual sanctions have been
imposed under the statute. Twenty years of threats without the actual
imposition of any sanctions may lead certified countries to doubt whether
the United States actually will impose sanctions pursuant to the Pelly
Amendment.
Norway has been certified four times under the Pelly Amendment over
its whaling practices, more than any other country. Certified in 1986,
1990, 1992 and 1993, Norway has yet to see any sanctions imposed
against it. In 1986, Norway was certified for violating the IWC morato-
rium on commercial whaling,73 despite the fact that Norway had legally
objected to the commercial ban and therefore was not bound by it.74
President Reagan opted not to impose any sanctions on Norway because
of its stated intention to suspend commercial whaling after the 1987
season. 7 Norway was certifiedin 1990 for taking minke whales in alleged
violation of the IWC research whaling criteria.' Again no sanctions were
imposed, with President Bush stating that efforts were being made to
"improve U.S.-Norwegian scientific consultations. '7 7 In 1992, Norway
was again certified for killing whales for research purposes in a manner
72. See President's Message to Congress Transmitting a Report, (1979) 1 Pub. Papers 265
at 265-66 (Feb. 13, 1979) (noting certification of Peru, Chile and the Republic of Korea). See
Martin & Brennan, supra note 57 at 299 (citing Letter from Secretary of Commerce Juanita
Kreps to President Jimmy Carter (Dec. 14, 1977)). At the time, these countries were not
members of the IWC, and thus technically had not breached the IWC quotas.
73. See "Commerce Secretary Considers Banning Fish Imports from Norway in Response to
Whaling" Int'l Trade Reporter (BNA) (11 June 1986) 778. See also President's Message to
Congress on Norwegian Noncompliance With the International Whaling Conservation Pro-
gram, (1986) 2 Pub. Papers 1051 (Aug. 4, 1986) [hereinafter President's Message on
Norwegian Noncompliance].
74. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
75. President's Message on Norwegian Noncompliance, supra note 73. Norway discontin-
ued all domestic commercial whaling in 1987.
76. See Wilkinson, supra note 31 at 277-79 (noting that the research whaling provision of
the International Whaling Convention became a loophole that was used by South Korea,
Iceland, Japan and Norway in attempts to continue commercial whaling).
77. Norway was apparently able to convince the United States that its research program met
the minimum IWC criteria for research whaling. Editorial, "Japan's Contemptuous Whalers"
The New York Times (21 December 1988) A34, col. I [hereinafter "Japan's Contemptuous
Whalers"]. The U.S. Secretary of Commerce was apparently concerned that certification
would antagonize Norway and "that it was vital to keep fully involved in the IWC process those
countries that have a tradition or future interest in whaling." See Martin & Brennan, supra note
57 at 314 (quoting July 15, 1988 Letter from Acting Secretary of Commerce Donna Tuttle).
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allegedly inconsistent with IWC criteria. Despite the alleged violation of
the IWC program, President Bush again declined to impose a sanction.71
The American zeal to certify Norway continued unabated in 1993,
with the latest certification based on Norway's alleged violation of the
IWC zero catch limit for minke whales. 9 Although President Clinton was
originally due to decide whether or not to impose trade sanctions by
October 4, 1993,10 once again the United States has demonstrated a
reluctance to impose sanctions. 8' Stating that he wished to avoid future
trade sanctions in anticipation of a mutually acceptable solution to the
whaling issue,82 President Clinton indicated that the United States aims
to reach agreement with Norway on whaling through negotiations at the
IWC's annual meeting in May 1994.11
The experience of the last twenty years has shown that the United
States has used the Pelly Amendment as an economic threat in an effort
to induce other countries to adopt U.S.-mandated courses of conduct
regarding whales and other marine animals. Even though trade sanctions
have to date never been imposed pursuant to the Pelly Amendment, the
statute may nonetheless constitute a significant economic threat for
countries for which the United States is a significant export market for
fish and wildlife products.84 Despite the statute's coercive potential, the
U.S. Congress was dissatisfied with the discretion exercisable under the
Act and, in 1979, enacted the more stringent Packwood-Magnuson
78. See President's Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Whaling Activities of
Norway" (1992) 2 Pub. Papers 2213 at 2213-14. The ostensible reason for this was the
American desire to work with Norway within the IWC rather than to exacerbate the issue by
imposing economic sanctions.
79. See President's Message on Whaling Activities, supra note 14. See "General Develop-
ments" Int'l Trade Reporter (BNA) (10 November 1993) 1825. Norway was certified despite
the fact that Norway has legally and formally opted out of the moratorium via the Objections
Procedure of the Convention. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid. President Clinton stated that because "the primary interest of the United States in this
matter is protecting the integrity of the IWC and its conservation regime, I believe our
objectives can best be achieved by delaying the implementation of sanctions until we have
exhausted all good faith efforts to persuade Norway to follow agreed conservation measures."
82. Ibid. President Clinton concluded his Letter to Congress by stating that "[it] is my sincere
hope that Norway will agree to and comply with such measures so that sanctions become
unnecessary."
83. See Economics & Trade Division, American Embassy in Oslo, Press Release, "Clinton
Delays Sanctions Against Norway Whaling" (October 1993). Personal meeting with Robert
Garverik of Economics & Trade Division, American Embassy in Oslo, March 25, 1994.
84. In 1985, Norway exported more than US $143 million worth offish products to the United
States. Norway's total fish exports that year were valued at approximately US $1 billion. See
"Commerce Secretary Considers Banning Fish Imports from Norway in Response to Whaling"
Int'l Trade Reporter (BNA ) (11 June 1986) 778.
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Amendment"5 to deal specifically with countries who act so as to allegedly
diminish the effectiveness of certain IWC programs.16
b) The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment
Under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, the U.S. Secretary of
Commerce is to determine whether the nationals of a foreign country,
directly or indirectly, are acting so as to diminish the effectiveness of the
IWC and the International Whaling Convention.87 A positive finding by
the Secretary is deemed to be a certification under thePellyAmendment.5
The crucial aspect of the Packwood-MagnusonAmendmentis that if such
a certification is made, the Secretary of State must reduce the certified
country's fishery allocation in U.S. waters by notless than fifty percent.8 9
If the conditions that led to the certification still exist unremedied after
oneyear, existing allocations in U.S. waters are completely rescinded and
no future fishery allocations to the offending country are permitted.90
However, the 1986 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Japan Whaling
Association v. American Cetacean Society9 established that the Secre-
85. See supra note 33.
86. See 125 Cong. Rec. H22, 083-84 (daily ed. August 2,1979), and McDorman, supra note
35 at 485.
87. Supra note 33, s. 1821 (e)(2)(A)(i).
88. Ibid.
89. Supra note 33, s. 1821(e)(2)(B). Pursuant to the 1976 Magnuson Fishery Conservation
and Management Act, the United States may enter into a "governing international fishing
agreement" (GIFA) under which a foreign state may have access to certain living resources in
the 200 nautical mile fishing zone of the United States (16 U.S.C. s. 1821 (c) (1988)).
90. Ibid., s. 1821(e)(2)(D). See also McDorman, supra note 35 at 486. For a discussion of
whether the withdrawal of fisheries access by a coastal state is consistent with international
fisheries law, see D.D. Caron, "International Sanctions, Ocean Management, and the Law of
the Sea: A Study of Denial of Access to Fisheries" (1989) 16 Ecology L. Q. 311.
91. 478 U.S. 221 at 241 (1986).
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tary of Commerce was not required to certify every country whose
nationals violated IWC quotas.92
Following U.S. threats of fish products import embargoes and reduced
fishery allocations under the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amend-
ments, Spain, Korea, Taiwan and Chile all substantially modified their
whaling practices to bring them into line with IWC programs and
practices. 93 In 1985, the Soviet Union was certified for its harvest of
minke whales in contravention of the IWC's 1982 whaling moratorium,
despite that country's filing of a formal objection to the moratorium. 94
The Soviet Union's fishery allocations in U.S. waters were reduced by
half as required by the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment.95 However, as
previously mentioned, President Reagan opted not to impose trade
sanctions under the Pelly Amendment, because of the perceived negli-
gible effect Pelly sanctions would have on Soviet fish product sales
internationally, and because of the U.S. desire to maintain positive
commercial relations with the Soviets. 96 The Soviet Union did not alter
its minke harvesting practices within the following year, and thus all
Soviet fishery allocations in U.S. waters were rescinded pursuant to the
92. In 1982, the IVC established a zero quota for sperm whales for the 1983 to 1984 season
and a moratorium on whaling beginning with the 1985-86 season. Japan filed legal objections
against these measures. The United States threatened to use the Pelly Amendment and the
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment in an effort to persuade Japan to rescind its objection. After
negotiations, the Japanese agreed to restrict their harvest of sperm whales and to abide by the
IWC moratorium by 1988. Despite this agreement, the American Cetacean Society sought a
writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of Commerce to certify Japan because it violated
the IWC quota. The district court and court of appeals found in favour of the American
Cetacean Society, but the Supreme Court overturned these decisions. For a discussion of the
U.S.-Japan agreement, see AJ. Siegel, "The U.S.-Japan Whaling Accord: A Result of the
Discretionary Loophole in the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment" (1985) 19 Geo. Wash. J.
Int'l L. & Econ. 577 at 587-88 . For comments on the decision, see R.J. Haskell, Jr.,
"Abandoning Whale Conservation Initiatives in Japan Whaling Association v. American
Cetacean Society' (1987) 11 Harv. Env'tl L. Rev. 551 at 551-53; M.S. Feinstein, "American
Cetacean Society v. Baldridge: Executive Agreements and the Constitutional Limits of
Executive Branch Discretion in American Foreign Policy" (1986) 12 Brook. J. Int'l L. 209 at
237-38; M.K. Blatt, "Woe for the Whales: Japan WhalingAssociation v.American Cetacean
Society" (1986) 55 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1285 at 1296.
93. Spain agreed to abide by IWC quotas, the Republic of Korea decided not to allow the use
of IWC-banned cold harpoons, Taiwan agreed to the IWC moratorium despite not being a
member of the IWC, and Chile agreed to limit its whaling activities. See Martin & Brennan,
supra note 57 at 299-301, and McDorman, supra note 35 at 488.
94. President's Message to Congress Reporting on the Whaling Activities of the Soviet
Union, (1985) 1 Pub. Papers 704 (May 31, 1985).
95. Ibid. See P. Shabecoff, "Soviet Tells Conference it will Halt Commercial Whaling by
1987" The New York Times (20 July 1985) A2.
96. See supra note 94 at 705.
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Packwood-Magnuson Amendment.97 Following the Soviet Union's an-
nouncement that it would end all commercial whaling by 1987, the
United States decertified the Soviet Union.98
As previously mentioned, Norway was certified by the United States
in 1986 over its decision to continue commercial whaling.99 However, the
United States only certified Norway under the Pelly Amendment, and not
the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, because Norway was not eligible
to obtain an allocation of fishery resources in U.S. waters.'00 Given that
Norway continues to be ineligible for such an allocation, the Packwood-
Magnuson Amendment in reality constitutes an empty threat against
Norway.
In the late 1980s, the United States became concerned over the harvest
of whales under scientific permits while the moratorium was in place.101
Norway's 1988 proposal to harvest thirty-five minke whales for research
purposes was disapproved by the IWC, but was still not technically illegal
under the International Whaling Convention."2 Norway convinced the
United States that its research program satisfied the IWC's minimum
criteria for research whaling,103 and accordingly, Norway was not certi-
fied under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment.'04
Korea and Iceland were also under U.S. scrutiny over their research
whaling programs. In response to U.S. demands, Iceland modified its
program and Korea fully terminated its scheme. 05 Japan, whose widely-
publicized research whaling program was rejected by the IWC, was also
certified, under both the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments."0 6
97. Ibid.
98. See Martin & Brennan, supra note 57 at 307 (citing Letter from Secretary of Commerce
C. William Verity to President Ronald Reagan (Apr. 14,1988)). Decertification did not restore
Soviet fishery allocations in U.S. waters, though, as the Soviet Union was no longer eligible
for such allocations in 1988.
99. See President's Message on Norwegian Noncompliance, supra note 73.
100. See supra note 87. As regards fisheries access to foreign states, U.S. law largely follows
the relevant provisions in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10
December 1982, UN Doc. A/CONF 62/122 (1982), 21 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter UNCLOS
Convention]. The UNCLOS Convention is not yet in force and the United States has not signed
or ratified it (ibid. at 1477). See McDorman, supra note 35 at 489.
101. McDorman, supra note 35 at 489.
102. Ibid. The IWC's approval or disapproval of a member's research programs does not
affect the legality of those programs.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid. See also "Japan's Contemptuous Whalers," supra note 77.
105. Ibid. at 489-90. See also Martin & Brennan, supra note 57 at 301.
106. See President's Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
of the Senate Reporting on Japanese Whaling Activities, (1988) 1 Pub. Papers 424 (Apr. 6,
1988).
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However, no action was taken against Japan, partly because Japan did not
have any fishery allocations in U.S. waters, and perhaps because Japan
actually imported more fish products from the United States than the
United States did from Japan." 7
Although the United States has proved more willing to impose
sanctions (in the form of reductions in fishery allocations in U.S. waters)
under the Packwood-MagnusonAmendment than under thePellyAmend-
ment, for many countries Packwood-Magnuson sanctions are meaning-
less. Given that at present very few countries hold fishery allocations in
U.S. waters, the coercive force of the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment
may be even less than that of the PellyAmendment. As such, Norway may
in reality have little to fear from the threat of U.S. trade sanctions under
these statutes. Even so, there is no reason to believe that the United States
will reduce the number of threats it makes under either statute, as
presumably there will always be countries which, while fully abiding by
their international treaty and legal obligations, do not wish to comply with
unilateral U.S.-determined standards of conduct.
c) The Marine Mammal Protection Act
Although less directly applicable to alleged violations of the Interna-
tional Whaling Convention and IWC regulations, the MMPA10 could
have an effect on international whaling practices. Enacted in 1972, the
objective of the MMPA was to prohibit U.S. citizens, or non-U.S. citizens
in U.S. waters, from killing, harassing, or importing marine mammals
unless such action was consistent with the protective goals set out in the
statute."°9 Although primarily concerned with the excessive incidental
taking of dolphins," 0 the MMPA's import ban on marine mammal
products has "produced a significant change in the pattern of utilization
107. See P. Shabecoff, "U.S. Declares Japan in Violation on Whaling and May Curb Trade"
The New York Times (11 February 1988) Al, col. 4; C.L. Johnson, "Environmental Law:
Certification of Japanese Violations of International Whaling Agreements" (1988) 29 Harv.
Int'l L.J. 541 at 546.
108. See supra note 34.
109. H.R. Rep. No. 707, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144.
See G.C. Coggins, "Legal Protection for Marine Mammals: An Overview of Innovative
Resource Conservation Legislation" (1975) 6 Envtl. L. 1 at 10-15.
110. Ibid. See L.L. Hyde, "Dolphin Conservation in the Tuna Industry: The United States'
Role in an International Problem" (1979) 16 San Diego L. Rev. 665 at 665-70. See also L.L.
Lones, "The Marine Mammal Protection Act and International Protection of Cetaceans: A
Unilateral Attempt to Effectuate Transnational Conservation" (1989) 22 Vand. J. Transnat'l
L. 997 at 1022-27.
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of whale products.""'1 This is principally due to the importance of the
United States as an export market for any fish product.'12 For Norway, the
statute effectively blocks the export of whale products to the United
States. 113 However, Americans are not among the world's foremost
consumers of whale.
2. A Potential Action in the International Court of Justice
The 1WC does not have any institutional enforcement powers of its own.
However, an IWC member state could attempt to enforce compliance
with the International Whaling Convention or IWC directives by bring-
ing an action against an allegedly non-complying state in the Interna-
tional Court of Justice." 4 Only states are entitled to bring actions in the
ICJ.115 The grounds on which an action could potentially be brought
against Norway might include a violation of the IWC moratorium
through abuse of the Scientific Permits exception;" 6 abuse of the aborigi-
nal whaling exception; 7 Norway's breach of its obligation to work
within the IWC instead of unilaterally deciding to resume commercial
whaling; and improper exploitation, in the form of whaling, of a res
omnium to which every country is entitled." 8
The ICJ's jurisdiction to hear a case between two states depends upon
the consent of the states involved in the dispute." 9 A state may consent
to the ICJ'sjurisdiction in one of three ways: by special agreement to refer
an actual dispute to the court; by accepting the compulsory jurisdiction
111. See Wilkinson, supra note 31 at 280.
112. See supra note 84.
113. Whalebone, oil and baleen are commonly used in manufacturing and industrial produc-
tion. See Wilkinson, supra note 31 at 280.
114. The International Court of Justice [hereinafter ICJ] is the main judicial body of the
United Nations, set up in 1945 by the UN Conference in San Francisco, which prepared and
adopted the Charterof the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7,59 Stat. 1031,
145 U.K.F.S. 805 [hereinafter Charter], and the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7, 59 Stat. 1031 [hereinafter Statute of the CJ] forming an
integral part of the Charter. All state members of the UN are eo ipso parties to the Statute of
the ICJ. See E.J. Osmaficzyk, The Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International
Relations (New York: Taylor & Frances, 1990) at 447; J.G. Merrills, International Dispute
Settlement, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Grotius, 1991) at 109.
115. Ibid.
116. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
118. See Hoel, supra note 7 at 78.
119. See Merrills, supra note 114, and Osmaficzyk, supra note 114.
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of the court;1 20 or by signing a treaty or convention under which member
states bind themselves in advance to accept the jurisdiction of the
Court.1 21 In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction
in a given case the ICJ itself decides the matter.122
The ICJ also has an advisory jurisdiction to give legal opinions at the
request of international organizations. 12 The Court has indicated "a
weighty presumption in favour of taking the case," particularly in
disputes that are "no longer simply affairs between states, but a proper
concern of international organisations.' 1 24 An advisory opinion has the
benefit of being formally non-binding, and thus may facilitate settlement
between the states involved in a dispute more readily than an ordinary ICJ
decision. Another option available to states wishing to refer a dispute to
the ICJ is the Chambers procedure. 125 States may prefer this procedure
because it gives them control over the size, composition and expertise of
the Court.12
6
Where disputes referred to the Court are of both a legal and a political
nature, the Court has generally agreed to decide. 27 If a case brought
120. Pursuant to Article 36(2) of the Statute of the ICJ, states may give a broad undertaking
to accept the jurisdiction of the Court. See Merrills, supra note 114 at 110. Norway is one of
forty-seven states which have accepted the compulsoryjurisdiction of the ICJ. See Osmaficzyk,
supra note 114.
121. Articles 36(1) and 37 of the Statute of the ICJ. The International Whaling Convention
does not bind member states to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ. If the dispute between the
parties concerns the application of a treaty which has also been signed by other states, those
states are entitled to intervene and take part in the proceedings. See Osmaficzyk, supra note 114
at 448.
122. Article 36(6) of the Statute of the ICJ. See Merrills, supra note 114 at 112, and
Osmaficzyk, supra note 114.
123. See Merrills, supra note 114 at 122, and Osmaficzyk, supra note 114 at 448.
124. Merrills, ibid. at 122. See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, [1975] I.C.J. Rep. 12, and
Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary andRomania, First Phase, Advisory
Opinion, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 65.
125. Pursuant to Articles 26 and 29 of the Statute of theICJ. The revised Chambers procedures
were first used in the Gulf of Maine case, brought by Canada and the United States in 1981
(Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area. Constitution of Chamber,
Order of 20 January 1982, [1982] I.C.J. Rep. 3). See Merrills, supra note 114 at 126. Under the
Chambers procedure, ICJ litigants can elect to have legal issues of a technical or specialized
nature decided by a three-judge panel chosen for its expertise. The parties must agree on
employment of the procedure and on the composition of the Court.
126. The Chambers procedure may also offer significantly lower costs to a state involved in
an international dispute than either a full ICJ action or an arbitration proceeding. Further, states
may perceive "the chambers procedure as a way of having cases which raise highly technical
issues heard by small tribunals selected for their expertise." Merrills, ibid. at 127-28.
127. However, if a matter brought before the Court cannot be resolved on legal grounds, the
Court will not have jurisdiction unless the parties have expressly consented (ibid. at 140).
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before it raises an issue of international law, the Court will as a rule give
a decision on the matter.'28 In deciding cases, the ICJ has shown a
willingness to act equitably and to take into consideration current legal
developments.129
In referring cases to the ICJ, states may not necessarily be seeking
binding decisions. They may merely wish to have a single legal point or
limited issue decided, as part of a wider solution to a dispute. 130 Where
both parties to an ICJ case have agreed to go before the ICJ, the Court's
decision is usually determinative of the dispute in question.'. 1 If a party
refuses to appear, the Court can still render a decision, provided the Court
has jurisdiction and the applicant's case has a strong factual and legal
basis. 132 Decisions against unwilling states often fail to settle the dispute
in question. 133 Nevertheless, an ICJ action may serve to depoliticize a
dispute, potentially reduce tension and increase the likelihood of perma-
nent settlement.M A victory in the Court may also garner international
support for a state's case, and may persuade the losing party to change its
practices. For these reasons, an ICJ action brought against Norway by
another IWC member state could potentially contribute to an agreement
between Norway and the IWC on the viability of small-scale minke
whaling in the future.
3. Potential Extralegal Enforcement of the Moratorium
Faced with the increasingly evident powerlessness of the IWC to enforce
the moratorium and other IWC programs, activist environmental groups
may be tempted to "enforce" IWC regulations by their own means. Such
action would not be unprecedented. In 1986, the Sea Shepherd Conser-
vation Society (Sea Shepherd) sunk two Icelandic whaling boats in
128. Ibid.
129. For example, in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, while the Court could not recognize
Iceland's claim to the emerging concept of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), it did consider
Iceland's "preferential rights" (Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Merits,
[1974] I.C.J. Rep. 3 [hereinafter Fisheries Jurisdiction]). See Merrills, supra note 114 at 135.
130. Ibid. at 144.
131. Ibid.
132. Statute of the ICJ, art. 53, and ibid. at 148. See also Sir G. Fitzmaurice, "The Problem
of the 'Non-Appearing' Defendant Government" (1980) 51 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 89.
133. Merrills, ibid. at 148. See, for example, Fisheries Jurisdiction case, supra note 129, and
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, [1980] I.C.L Rep. 3.
134. Ibid. at 149.
The Resumption of Limited Commercial Whaling
Reykjavik harbour.135 Sea Shepherd justified their actions on the basis
that the Icelandic whaling fleet was violating the IWC moratorium on
commercial whaling. 13 6 In December 1992, the same organization at-
tempted to sink a Norwegian whaling vessel; the grounds for the action
were that Norway was taking whales in contravention of the IWC
moratorium.137
The extralegal enforcement efforts of vigilante environmental groups
such as Sea Shepherd are unlikely to ever gain support from the IWC,
primarily because of the substantial destruction of property that often
accompanies the activities of these groups. 3 Yet these groups are
unlikely to desist, as long as they believe that whales are not adequately
protected by existing institutions. 3 9
135. See "Giving the Cat Claws," supra note 17 at417. The Iceland incident was not the first
time Sea Shepherd decided to enforce whaling regulations on its own: "long before its scuttling
of the Icelandic whaling boats, the Sea Shepherd had made a reputation for itself in a series of
confrontations with pirate whalers." "Pirate whalers" or "whalers of convenience" are defined
as "vessels which belong neither to member nations [of the IWC], nor to fleets of recognized
non-member whaling nations. They operate under Flags of Convenience and have no direct
connection with their Ports of Registry or with any recognized whaling nation." See P. Bimie,
ed., International Regulation of Whaling, vol. 2 (New York: Oceana Publications, 1985) at
846.
136. Ibid.
137. In light of these two incidents, the IWC declared Sea Shepherd and its leader, Paul
Watson, to be "both non grata in the IWC because of sabotage." See Chairman's Report, supra
note 12 at 31. Prior to the Norwegian attempt, Watson had promised in an open letter to
Norwegians that his organization would "confront the whalers on the high seas." See Barrett,
supra note 51.
138. See "Giving the Cat Claws," supra note 17 at 432-33.
139. The whaling debate has been characterized as one between "preservationist and
conservationist camps." The conservationists, which would include Norway, would allow
restricted hunting of whales once scientific studies indicate that whale stocks have attained
levels where a small catch could be taken annually withoutjeopardizing the stocks' future. The
preservationists, on the other hand, are opposed to the resumption of whaling under any
circumstances, regardless of the size of particular whale stocks. Some preservationists are
animal-rights activists who oppose the killing of any animal, while others characterize whales
as a highly intelligent animal worthy of special protection. As one commentatorhas noted "the
real debate in the IWC has been between some countries wishing to preserve industries,
employment and a food source based on whale, and others wanting these animals classified as
sacrosanct." See J. Rusk, "Whaling Rules on Table in Kyoto" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail
(10 May 1993) Al. Other environmentalists have argued that current data on stocks are too
uncertain to determine exactly how healthy particular whale species are, and have thus called
for apermanent moratorium. See Editorial, "Whaling and Gnashing of Teeth" The [Edinburgh]
Scotsman (10 May 1993).
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IV. Conclusion
In allowing its nationals to resume small-scale commercial whaling on a
controlled basis, Norway has not violated any international law or treaty.
Norway has legally objected to the current IWC moratorium, and is thus
not bound by it. Nonetheless, as a result of its move, Norway potentially
faces U.S. import restrictions on its products, as well as economic and
political pressure from the European Union and its member countries.
Further, extralegal measures against Norwegian whalers are a distinct
possibility.
Norway has been the impetus behind many whale conservation mea-
sures adopted by the International Whaling Commission, including the
current moratorium adopted in 1985.14° Norway's justifications for
resuming commercial whaling accord with the findings of the IWC' s own
Scientific Committee. 4 Nonetheless, many states have condemned
Norway's actions and have threatened to impose political and economic
sanctions against the country.
Norway has a long history of whaling, and a long history of acting so
as to ensure the long-term viability of whale stocks.142 Whale meat is a
primary food source for many Norwegians.1 43 Norwegians are today
faced with an international community increasingly committed to the
complete abolition of commercial whaling, regardless of scientific data
which suggests that certain whale stocks can be harvested in limited
quantities without any detrimental effect on their long-term viability.144
Norwegians are understandably upset with foreign governments and
organizations that now threaten economic and political sanctions, given
Norway's history of environmental responsibility and full compliance
with international treaties, laws and obligations regarding whales.
140. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
